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Abstracts 
Fiscal policy is dominant (over monetary policy) when the stability of the price level has 
turned to be fiscal policy’s concern, thus making monetary policy redundant in the 
pursuant of the crucial price stability objective. This is a point of reversal of monetary 
policy and fiscal policy roles. By giving room to a high level of public debt, fiscal policy 
takes over the role of stabilising the price level from monetary policy. In effect, a fiscal 
dominance regime therefore connotes a system in which monetary tools are applied to 
guarantee the solvency of the government. This paper examined fiscal dominance in the 
Anglophone West Africa (The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and 
Guinea. These six countries were known as the West African Monetary Zone – WAMZ.  
This study is significant because of the need for the stability of the future monetary union 
which would be characterised by a single monetary policy in the West African sub-region 
while the fiscal policy governance would be at the national levels. The huge implication 
of fiscal dominance is that its absence is one of the conditions for the optimal functioning 
of monetary policy in achieving its objectives. The paper considered the view-points in 
Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) as put forward by Leeper (1991). Dynamic quantile 
regressions within the context of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification 
were applied. This allowed for necessary dynamic adjustments with the ARDL modelling 
in which inflation rate as the response (dependent) variable was regressed on the lagged 
value of itself and lagged value of fiscal ratios as the independent variables in the study 
covering the period between 1980 and 2014. Evidence gathered from this research work 
led the broad suggestion that fiscal dominance could not be ‘statistically’ established in 
the Anglophone West African countries and Guinea (the WAMZ). The implications this 
has for the future monetary union is that there are evidence to suggest that price stability 
in each of the WAMZ countries were achieved through the use of fiscal policy instruments 
at national levels and that monetary policy is not dormant in these economies. These 
results suggest that the common monetary policy would be active in achieving its desired 
goals, whereas, national fiscal policy would have no effects in this respect as six different 
fiscal policies would be left at individual national levels.  
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1. Introduction  
There are views within the economics world that monetary authorities are too fanatical 
with the price level and inflation. This view may be correct if one considers the risky and 
hurting effects of high public debt level on inflation and economic growth. This is the 
underlying factor affecting such fascination to inflation if the management of fiscal 
control is outside the confine of the monetary authority. Therefore, at the national level, 
sound fiscal policy is a necessity for the achievement of the monetary policy objectives. 
For a country, if public debt is increasing, the monetary policy would be put under 
pressure to react to this development accordingly so as to avert inflationary pressures. 
However, this may be cumbersome in a monetary union where fiscal policies are under 
different national authorities. It may occur that such expected reaction is made by fiscal 
policy, meaning that the stability of the price level has turned to be fiscal policy concern, 
thus making monetary policy redundant in the pursuant of the crucial price stability objective. This is a point at which fiscal policy is ‘dominant’. It is a point of reversal of 
monetary policy and fiscal policy roles. In such situation, the main focus of fiscal policy is 
the determination of inflation level, just as public debt in real terms is stabilised by 
monetary policy, just to safeguard government solvency. By giving room to a high level of 
public debt, fiscal policy takes over the role of stabilising the price level from monetary 
policy. A fiscal dominance regime therefore connotes a system in which monetary tools 
are applied to guarantee the solvency of the government.  
This paper examined if fiscal policy is dominant (over monetary policy) in the 
Anglophone West Africa (comprising of The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone) and Guinea (hereinafter referred to as the West African Monetary Zone – WAMZ).  
This study is of significance because of the need for the stability of the future monetary 
union which would be characterised by a single monetary policy in the West African sub-
region while the fiscal policy governance would be at the national levels. The huge 
implication of fiscal dominance is that its absence is one of the conditions for the optimal 
functioning of monetary policy in achieving its objectives. Therefore, the expected results 
and findings from this research study would have implications for the future common 
central bank in West Africa, in the efforts of the African sub region towards inflation 
targeting, inflation moderation (price stability) and exchange rate management in the 
proposed monetary union.  
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2. Theoretical Background 
Behaviours of fiscal and monetary authorities could classified as: (i) ‘passive behaviour’ and (ii) ‘active behaviour’ Leeper (1991). In general terms, Leeper (2016) connotes ‘active’ as a situation where the policy authority has the freedom to pursue its objective while ‘passive’ means the policy authority generates constraints through the active authority’s behaviour and the price sector. These are his view-points in his Fiscal Theory 
of Price Level (FTPL) that highlights the two fundamental basic tasks of macroeconomic 
policies as: (i) the determination of inflation; and (ii) ensuring debt stability. Leeper 
(2016) stressed the two different mixes of the interplay of monetary and fiscal 
behaviours that can guarantee the delivery of these two fundamental tasks as: (i) active 
monetary policy combined with passive fiscal policy (which depict monetary 
dominance); and (ii) active fiscal policy combined with passive monetary policy (which 
reflect fiscal dominance). 
In fiscal dominance situation when active fiscal policy is combined with passive monetary 
policy, policy makers set surplus largely independent of the levels of government debt 
and inflation condition. The fiscal behaviour eventually determines the price level. Debt 
would then be stabilised when the monetary authority allows the surprise changes in 
inflation and prices of bonds to adjust the value of government debt (revaluation of government debt). This results into government debt’s market value being equal to the 
present value of future surplus. Here, the monetary authority does not attempt at fighting 
inflation. In fiscal dominant regime, monetary policy is tasked with debt stabilisation 
while the price level determination is left with fiscal policy, thus altering the roles of the 
two policies. 
The fiscal theory of price level (FTPL) countered the conventional position that changes 
in price level are driven by monetary factors. The theory states that public debt (a fiscal 
variable) determines the price level, meaning that the determination of inflation or price 
level stems from the need to achieve fiscal solvency. This implies a relationship between 
inflation and fiscal variables. In his contribution to the development of FTPL, Woodford 
(2001) opines that there is the manifestation of fiscal dominance when the monetary 
authority is under pressure to apply monetary policy tools in stabilising the market value 
of debt. Furthermore, there is fiscal dominance in situation where the path of government 
revenue, expenditure and public debt are independently fixed by the fiscal authority 
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while the monetary authority (in order to satisfy the GIBC conditions) are left with 
influencing the path of money creation revenue. These positions reflect the theoretical 
relationship between government deficit and seigniorage revenue. According to the 
FTPL, the GIBC is an equilibrium condition and therefore, in situation of an exogenously 
determined order of future budget surplus, the only economic variable that brings 
consistency between past value of nominal bonds and the present value of primary 
surpluses is the price level. This makes the GIBC to be the determinant of the price level. 
The simple illustration of this process is that: if there is reduction in the present value of the future primary balance (caused by governments’ tax cut) after which aggregate 
demand and price level are enhanced due to increase in real household wealth. There 
would be decline in real value of government debt with a resultant effect of the 
restoration of balance in the GIBC. 
There are many channels through which monetary and fiscal policies could be linked 
together. In an instance, there is the macroeconomic argument that inflation comes from 
budget deficits because money creation is adopted as a tool commonly applied by 
government to offset fiscal deficits.1 Thus, the consolidated government intertemporal 
budget constraints (GIBC) provides a link between fiscal and monetary policy. In fiscal 
period, government expenditure are financed by government revenue (taxes, commodity 
windfalls etc.), new issue of debt and seigniorage revenue. If the GIBC reflects that 
seigniorage revenue and present value of current and future monetary balance both 
back-up the outstanding public debt, then an investigation of fiscal dominance would 
reveal how significant the back up by these variable in determining the price level is. 
Leeper (2016) clearly distinguished between a monetary dominance and fiscal 
dominance regimes as highlighted in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This however serves as a drawback to monetary policy in the achievement of its objectives stabilising the price 
level. 
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Table 1: Distinction between Monetary Dominance and Fiscal Dominance 
In Monetary Dominance: 
*Fiscal policy exhibits 
‘Ricardian equivalence’; 
*Monetary policy follows 
its inflation target path. 
 
Active Monetary 
Policy 
Monetary authority pursues its inflation target 
independent of fiscal policies. 
Tight, contractionary monetary policy 
Passive Fiscal 
Policy 
Fiscal authority determines tax and spending levels, 
independent of GIBC consideration. 
Loose and expansionary fiscal policy 
In Fiscal Dominance:  
*Fiscal policy exhibits 
‘non-Ricardian 
equivalence; 
*Fiscal policy significantly 
affects inflation and price 
stability; 
*Monetary policy ensures 
public debt stability; 
FTPL holds. 
Active Fiscal 
Policy 
Fiscal authority effects tax and expenditure changes in 
order to balance the budget intertemporaly. 
Fiscal policy allows long run unsustainable and 
excessively budget deficit higher than the sustainable 
budget deficit. 
Loose and expansionary fiscal policy. 
Passive Monetary 
Policy  
Monetary authority sets interest rates to accommodate 
fiscal policy. 
Loose, expansionary monetary policy 
Source: Leeper, (2016) 
In fiscal dominance regime, whenever there is a rise in price level due to expansionary 
fiscal shock, monetary growth would passively increase equally because the monetary 
authority is compelled to accommodate the fiscal shock. If the long term government 
budget balance is to be maintained under this regime in which fiscal policy allows long run unsustainable and excessively high budget deficits, the proposition of Leeper’s model 
is that inflation target of central bank would be abandoned, and the central bank gives 
room for the emergence of higher inflation (that is, expansionary monetary policy). This 
consequently causes the monetary authority to either inflate the public debt or work 
towards generating seigniorage revenue that could be transferred to the fiscal side 
(budget). This therefore reflects fiscal dominance as a phenomenon of government’s long 
term sustainability (when primary balance is not kept at equilibrium) and higher 
inflation is generated (than warranted) and original target of monetary policy is 
abandoned when loose (passive) monetary policy is adopted.  It should be noted that it is an underlying assumption of the FTPL that government’s 
actions are not constrained by budgetary issues; and according to FTPL (which holds in 
a fiscal dominance regime), fiscal policy determines prices when there are no budgetary 
adjustments in response to fiscal shocks affecting the government intertemporal budget constraints (GIBC) thus reflecting the ‘non-Ricardian’ behaviour in which price is made 
to adjust to balance the budget constraints. Hence, fiscal policy plays a more important 
role than monetary policy in ensuring price stability and in determining inflation in a 
fiscal dominance regime. Therefore, under such regime, fiscal policy changes must impact 
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the price level regardless of the degree of monetary authority’s commitment to price stability. In this ‘non-Ricardian’ fiscal policy situation, there could be high inflation and 
price instability. This appears not to be the best option for monetary unions. However, 
there had been huge criticisms of the FTPL: (a) for its clear lack of empirical relevance, 
and (b) about how it treats the government solvency condition. (However, for monetary 
unions, the FTPL gives reasons for putting fiscal restrictions in place).   
The fiscal dominance issue is more complex in monetary union cases where the conduct 
of monetary policy is in the hands of a common central bank while fiscal authorities at 
the national levels determine the fiscal policy. In this respect, there may be conflict of 
views and ideas, policy and actions as dictated by the specific macroeconomic situation 
in individual member countries. This necessitates the investigation of fiscal dominance 
in the context of feasibility study of the monetary integration of West Africa so as to 
establish if the West African economies under study here exhibit fiscal dominance 
towards the achievement of price stability and inflation moderation; and if so, this points 
to the possibility of a redundant future common monetary policy within the future West 
African monetary integration. 
Nevertheless, in the event of monetary integration when the monetary policy formulation 
will be transferred to a supra-national level and the formulation of fiscal policies (of 
members states) remains at national levels, the competing views or rather, the 
interactions of monetary and fiscal policies and how they affect inflation under two 
conflicting fiscal dominance and monetary dominance regimes are very crucial and 
relevant for policy makers at both national and supra-national levels within such 
monetary integrated bloc. Specifically, FTPL could be of interest to existing and 
prospective monetary unions because it will contribute in revealing and explaining the 
pattern of price level evolution across such monetary unions, particularly in member 
states.2  
3. Model Specification and Methods 
Fiscal policy dominance in the WAMZ was investigated here applying dynamic quantile 
regression within the context of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification, 
                                                          
2 There are fiscal limitations imposed on existing and proposed members of monetary unions in order to ensure that the ‘fiscal dominance’ and ‘monetary dominance’ are appropriately and justifiably institutionalised. 
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allowing for necessary dynamic adjustments where inflation rate as the response 
(dependent) variable was regressed on the lagged value of itself and lagged value of 
budget expenditure/GDP ratio as the fiscal variable. 
In econometric modelling, it is possible not to have predictive or strong relationship 
between the mean of the dependent variable and the independent variable distribution 
because many factors affecting a dependent variable may be omitted in the modelling. In 
spite of this, there may still be some vital predictive relationship with some other 
components of the dependent variable distribution. Since most regression models 
analyse the conditional mean of the response variable, there are now growing interests 
in the modelling of other portion of the dependent variable conditional mean. Quantile 
regression employed in estimation in this study, is a method that does this by modelling 
the quantiles of the response variables, giving the linear relationship between 
explanatory variables and a given dependent variable quantile. Quantile regression was 
initially developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) to allow for the influence of the 
independent variable on the median or other quantiles/percentiles of the dependent 
variable. 
Quantile regression (QR) is prudent regression method (an alternative to the traditional 
OLS method) characterised by reduced sensitivity to the violation of the classical model 
assumptions (BLUE- best, linear unbiased estimators). A fundamental limitation of the 
OLS is the concentration of its approach on the estimation of mean value of the dependent 
variable, conditional on the given values of the independent variables. The observation is 
that most of the econometric estimations are averagely based on mean, whereas, many 
variables are characterised by continuous distribution which are bound to change (either 
by compression or expansion) in a way that could not be revealed by the analysis of the 
mean, thus preventing the knowledge of how the whole distribution behaves. Quantile 
regression (QR) attends to this shortcoming by assessing fuller description of the 
conditional distribution of the variables rather than just the conditional mean as we have 
in the OLS method (Gujarati, 2015). The QR approach reveals how median as an 
alternative to mean, as a measure of central tendency (central probability distribution) is 
impacted by independent variables. For the fact that in high skewed distribution, the 
median provides more information and is less-sensitive to outliers (unlike the mean). In 
QR, the median (or the selected quantile) of the dependent variable is estimated 
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conditional on independent variable values, but the OLS estimates the mean of the 
dependent variable. While the OLS method finds the regression plane that minimises the 
sum of the square residuals, the QR finds the regression plane that minimises the sum of 
the absolute residuals. The least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator is a special form of 
the quantile regression in which the effects of independent variables on different parts 
(not only the median or the mean) of the dependent variable distribution are estimated; 
and it came up because of the distortions of the OLS estimates by outliers. 
LAD is an estimation approach that guides the effects of outliers as a result of the lower 
extent of sensitivity when compared with the OLS estimations. It reduces the rate at which econometricians are concerned with ‘undue influence’ of observation in OLS 
estimates. The objective function of LAD is linear, implying that the LAD objective 
function would increases by one unit as a positive residual increases by one unit; but in 
contrast there is increasing importance given to large residuals by the OLS objective 
function, thereby making OLS to be more sensitive to outlying observations (Wooldridge, 
2014). The less-sensitivity of LAD to data extreme value changes (compared to the OLS) 
caused LAD not to give increasing weight to disturbance terms that are larger. The design 
of LAD is in a way that it estimates parameters of the conditional median (rather than the 
conditional mean) of the dependent variable, given the independent variables. This 
causes, LAD to be resilient to outliers since large changes in outliers have no effects on 
the median. Drawing from these, LAD is advantageous over the OLS in that partial effects 
(predictions) can be obtained easily, particularly, when data are transformed.  
It is also important to add that the conditional quantile function is the basic underlying 
principle of the quantile regression model which can model any quantile. The approach 
requires no strong distributional assumption about the disturbance term unlike the 
requirements of error term normality in the OLS modelling. Quantiles indicates where an 
observation lies within an ordered series of dependent variable. The median is at the 
middle, 10th percentile (for instance) is lower in value and below the median (which is 
the 50th percentile) thus placing 10% of the value above the median and 90% of the value 
above it, and so on. Therefore, in this case, given the independent variable, we can 
determine the quantile of a random dependent variable 𝑦 having cumulative distribution 𝐹(𝑦) as: 𝑄(𝜑) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑦: 𝐹(𝑦) ≥ 𝜑 
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In this function, in satisfying the inequality, infimum denotes the ‘greatest lower bound’ 
smaller than the value of the dependent variable 𝑦.  
The ARDL (p, q) modelling is employed here because of the dynamic correlation of 
inflation and fiscal balance. In order to characterise the stylised fact of price level changes 
in the WAMZ, the ARDL (1, 1) specification of the dynamic quantile regression model is 
expressed as: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−1𝑝𝑘=1 𝛼𝑘(𝜑) + ∑ 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑟𝑠=0 𝛽𝑠(𝜑) + ∑ 𝐵𝐵𝑡−1𝑞𝑗=0 𝛽𝑗(𝜑) + 𝜀𝑡                          1 
where 𝜋𝑡  is inflation rate, 𝜋𝑡−𝑘 , 𝛼𝑘(𝜑),  𝛽𝑠(𝜑) and 𝛽𝑗(𝜑) are the estimated parameters  at 
the 𝜑th quantile, representing various effects of explanatory variables on different levels 
of inflation, being functions of the quantiles while 𝜀𝑡  is the disturbance term. This model 
gives information about the differing inflationary impacts of the explanatory variables. 
Because the fit are not always good for values of quantiles (𝜑) close to the two extremes 
of 0 and 1, this study chooses (𝜑) = 0.25 (the twenty fifth percentile), (𝜑) = 0.50  (the 
median) and (𝜑) = 0.75  (the seventy-fifth percentile) as the comparative quantiles of 
interest. The bootstraps covariance estimation option (with 100 bootstrap replications) 
is applied in the simultaneous quantile regressions to derive the parameter coefficients 
and standard errors. 
Data employed in this estimation are the inflation rate, money supply (M1), budget 
expenditure and fiscal budget balance of the six WAMZ countries assessed in this study, 
covering the 15-year period between 1980 and 2014. The focus of the assessment of fiscal 
dominance in the WAMZ is on the results of the regression of inflation on budget 
expenditure. The choice of budget expenditure as the fiscal variable in this study is borne 
out of the external influence of commodity windfall on the fiscal revenue, and the 
eventual distorting effects on fiscal balances in these West African primary commodity 
exporting countries. Inferences based on the expenditure side of the fiscal policy 
structure is reasonable and meaningful in giving clearer picture of national control of 
fiscal stance within a monetary integrated system. The estimation employed budget 
expenditure/base money (M1) ratio as fiscal variable and the independent variable while 
inflation is the dependent variable. Because of data constraints Liberia was left out of this 
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estimation. Robustness check was performed with of models in which budget 
expenditure/GDP and budget balance/GDP ratios serve as fiscal policy variables.  
4. Results and Findings 
 This study applied the ARDL modelling of fiscal policy dominance because the responses 
of macroeconomic variables in developing economies are usually sluggish. Consequently, 
the interest here is in the parameters of one-period lagged fiscal policy variables.   
Table 1: Results of Fiscal Dominance Assessment of the WAMZ Countries  
(Budget Expenditure/Money Base)  
 25th Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
50th Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
75th Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
Gambia: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.2048 (0.2380) 
-1.2874 (0.9467) 
-0.7711 (0.6424) 
3.7581 (1.2807) 
0.17 
13 
 
0.0336 (0.2105) 
-0.7790 (0.8298) 
0.2625 (0.6878) 
3.3100 (1.2800) 
0.33 
13 
 
0.7892 (0.1977) 
-1.2200 (0.9909) 
0.4364 (0.5938) 
3.5875 (1.1532) 
0.53 
13 
Ghana: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.5644 (0.5859) 
0.8089 (0.9646) 
-1.1836 (0.9116) 
-0.0171 (3.3622) 
0.16 
32 
 
0.2694 (0.6935) 
0.7131 (1.1052) 
-2.0800** (0.9540) 
3.2255 (3.9810) 
0.19 
32 
 
0.5457 (0.8801) 
0.5546 (1.3843) 
-1.4288 (0.9885) 
2.2808 (5.1548) 
0.20 
32 
Guinea: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
1.1896 (0.7484) 
-2.2019 (1.4632) 
2.2749 (1.7573) 
-1.2947 (2.9565) 
0.16 
20 
 
0.3909 (0.4431) 
-2.1479** (1.1806) 
1.0352 (1.3055) 
2.6791 (1.7037) 
0.37 
20 
 
0.4037 (0.3159) 
-1.8395*** (1.0627) 
0.7276 (0.9651) 
3.9950* (1.4229) 
0.35 
20 
Nigeria: 
Lagged Inflation:  
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
-0.0022 (0.2739) 
-0.6062 (0.8299) 
1.1277* (0.3897) 
1.5686** (0.8053) 
0.16 
28 
 
0.2141 (0.1629) 
0.4678 (0.6884) 
0.6758 (0.4913) 
0.8431 (0.7289) 
0.21 
28 
 
0.0645 (0.3449) 
1.2248 (1.1727) 
0.2767 (0.8413) 
1.3780 (1.2535) 
0.17 
28 
Sierra Leone: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.5245** (0.2834) 
-1.3004 (0.5564) 
-0.9011 (0.6782) 
2.9082** (1.4671) 
0.37 
30 
 
0.3819*** (0.2280) 
0.2124 (0.4173) 
-1.0820 (0.5911) 
3.4984 (1.1997) 
0.34 
30 
 
0.3097 (0.2181) 
-0.0884 (0.4298) 
-0.6002 (0.6250) 
3.8023* (1.0729) 
0.37 
30 
         Source: Author’s Estimation and Stata 14 Output 
         Note: The bootstrap standard error coefficients are in parenthesis. 
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The results in Table 1 above reflect a mix of positive and negative signs of the coefficients 
which are generally statistically insignificant at 5% level of significance across the three 
quantiles estimations for the six countries.  
Table 2: Results of Fiscal Dominance Assessment of the WAMZ Countries  
(Budget Expenditure/GDP Ratio) 
 25th Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
50th Quantile  
Bootstrap Coefficient 
and Standard Error   
75th Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
Gambia: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
-0.3919 (0.1860) 
0.3062 (0.6063) 
-0.2096 (0.7084) 
3.5462 (1.2516) 
0.16 
23 
 
-0.1181 (0.1827) 
0.4226 (0.6755) 
0.1483 (0.8477) 
4.8080 (1.2462) 
0.19 
23 
 
0.1158* (0.3127) 
0.0906 (0.8233) 
0.8453 (0.9573) 
5.8942 (1.7777) 
0.20 
23 
Ghana: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
1.0841 (0.7132) 
0.6327 (2.4178) 
-1.4279 (2.1830) 
-4.2793 (4.5131) 
0.10 
32 
 
0.4788 (0.6543) 
0.8491 (1.6917) 
-0.4614 (1.7602) 
1.4558 (4.269) 
0.16 
32 
 
0.4501 (0.7032) 
0.9985 (2.0584) 
0.1266 (1.7537) 
4.0180 (4.6467) 
0.18 
32 
Guinea: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.8708**(0.3898) 
1.9865 (1.8891) 
-1.3215 (2.7861) 
1.6995 (6.1167) 
0.35 
20 
 
0.6103***(0.3263) 
2.0578 (1.3486) 
-2.4031 (2.0072) 
0.1583 (5.4807) 
0.26 
20 
 
0.5218 (0.3085) 
2.0654 (1.4650) 
-2.1950 (2.2458) 
1.1073 (4.9240) 
0.17 
20 
Liberia: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
-0.0692 (0.3933) 
-0.8639 (1.1745) 
0.9728 (1.1620) 
1.5934 (1.5836) 
0.08 
24 
 
-0.2709 (0.2777) 
-0.1119 (1.0465) 
0.2666 (1.0100) 
3.1798 (1.1619) 
0.12 
24 
 
-0.2194 (0.2166) 
0.1659 (0.9288) 
0.0488 (0.9286) 
3.6612 (0.8326) 
0.20 
24 
Nigeria: 
Lagged Inflation:  
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.1619 (0.3096) 
-0.1382 (0.8443) 
-1.2302 (0.7729) 
-1.2509 (2.1537) 
0.24 
27 
 
0.1914 (0.1946) 
0.2010 (0.6653) 
-1.4491 (0.8901) 
-0.7869 (1.4407) 
0.33 
27 
 
0.3288 (0.3086) 
0.3266 (1.0627) 
-2.4553 (1.3233) 
-2.4726 (1.8725) 
0.29 
27 
Sierra Leone: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Expenditure (t): 
Budget Expenditure (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.7839* (0.2882) 
0.6355 (1.3151) 
0.8446 (1.3452) 
4.5249 (4.1865) 
0.23 
30 
 
0.6260** (0.3051) 
0.4127 (0.9708) 
0.4681 (1.1173) 
3.7457 (3.1513) 
0.27 
30 
 
0.3038 (0.3006) 
0.5067 (0.9361) 
0.6994 (0.9362) 
6.1760*** (3.2559) 
0.26 
30 
        Source: Author’s Estimation and Stata 14 Output. 
        Note: The bootstrap standard error coefficients are in parenthesis.  
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One common outcome are the similarities in the respective coefficient signs for lagged 
fiscal variable of interest in each case of the WAMZ countries across the three estimated 
quantiles (except for The Gambia in the 25th quantile estimation  result).  Also we can 
gather that the pattern of changes (increases/decreases) in the magnitude of the 
influence of fiscal policy on the price level across the three quantiles are not similar. 
This study lays particular emphasis is placed on the results at the median (50th quantile) 
and the 75th quantile in which similarities of the insignificant direction of the fiscal 
influence are well established. For the lagged fiscal variable, the statistically insignificant 
coefficients for The Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria show positive signs, while negative signs 
were reported for Ghana and Sierra Leone. Because of the statistical insignificance of the 
t-statistics of the coefficients of the variable of interest (as Table 1 above displays), there 
are evidence to suggest that there is no statistically significant linear influence of fiscal 
policy on the median and quantiles of changes in prices level (inflation) in the WAMZ. 
This indirectly implies ‘no fiscal dominance’ in the WAMZ. 
The outcome of the robustness checks in which fiscal variables (budget expenditure/GDP 
and budget balance/GDP ratios) were applied as the fiscal policy explanatory variables 
are displayed in Table 2 above and Table 3 below. Equally, these results are equally 
characterised by the insignificance of the coefficients of parameter of interest, at 5% level 
of significance across the three estimated quantiles.  These results confirm statistical 
insignificance of the t-statistics of the fiscal variables (budget expenditure/GDP and 
budget balance/GDP) as obtained in the earlier results of the regression of inflation on 
budget expenditure/base money. 
The pseudo R-squared figures reported by the three quantiles vary. Nevertheless, we 
cannot interpret pseudo R-squared independently except for the purpose of making 
comparison across various models derived in making predictions in the same regard. 
Since pseudo R-squared would have meanings when applied in making comparison with 
one another, in same data sets and for same purpose, we can infer that the model in which 
budget expenditure scaled by money supply is fiscal variable comparatively gives the best 
of the outcomes. In spite of the areas of differences in the three fiscal dominance tests 
performed, this study abides with the results of the fiscal dominance assessment in which 
the fiscal expenditure variable is scaled by monetary money base variable whereby the 
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proportion of government expenditure to money supply is allowed to influence changes 
in the piece levels in these WAMZ countries.  
 
Table 3: Results of Fiscal Dominance Assessment of the WAMZ Countries  
(Budget Balance/GDP Ratio) 
 25 Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
50 Quantile  
Bootstrap Coefficient 
and Standard Error   
75 Quantile  
Bootstrap 
Coefficient and 
Standard Error   
Gambia: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Balance (t): 
Budget Balance (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
-0.4326** (0.1823) 
-0.0031 (0.0496) 
0.0459 (0.0557) 
-3.4771 (0.3489) 
0.18 
23 
 
-0.2201 (0.2164) 
-0.02667 (0.0678) 
0.0484 (0.6010) 
3.3510 (0.4342) 
0.11 
23 
 
-0.2511 (0.2882) 
0.0002 (0.0885) 
0.0610 (0.0643) 
3.7889 (0.6574) 
0.12 
23 
Ghana: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Balance (t): 
Budget Balance (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.5056 (0.4558) 
0.1586 (0.1114) 
-0.1233 (0.8992) 
0.1296 (1.4917) 
0.14 
32 
 
0.6966*** (0.3980) 
0.0908 (0.1410) 
-0.0436 (0.1011) 
0.0975 (1.4785) 
0.15 
32 
 
0.4931 (0.5220) 
0.1164 (0.1420) 
-0.0416 (0.1310) 
1.1627 (1.8831) 
0.19 
32 
Guinea: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Balance (t): 
Budget Balance (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.7184 (0.4622) 
0.2182 (0.2765) 
-0.0464 (0.3332) 
-0.0361 (1.2443) 
0.28 
20 
 
0.4196 (0.3311) 
-0.0675 (0.1662) 
-0.0225 (0.1822) 
0.8318 (0.8915) 
0.25 
20 
 
0.4120 (0.3097) 
0.0198 (0.1425) 
-0.1363 (0.1727) 
1.2133 (0.8407) 
0.10 
20 
Nigeria: 
Lagged Inflation:  
Budget Balance (t): 
Budget Balance (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.0526 (0.3356) 
-0.1012 (0.1641) 
-0.1667 (0.1321) 
1.2296 (0.7339) 
0.27 
27 
 
0.2612 (0.2724) 
0.0149 (0.1375) 
-0.1746 (0.1261) 
1.5312* (0.6534) 
0.23 
27 
 
0.4504** (0.2335) 
0.0331 (0.0846) 
-0.2355* (0.0845) 
13312*** (0.7151) 
0.34 
27 
Sierra Leone: 
Lagged Inflation: 
Budget Balance (t): 
Budget Balance (t-1): 
Intercept: 
Pseudo R2: 
Observations: 
 
0.6367** (0.3429) 
-0.0374 (0.0812) 
-0.0160 (0.0994) 
0.4370 (0.8823) 
0.22 
30 
 
0.7038** (0.2844) 
-0.1003 (0.7652) 
0.0224 (0.0759) 
0.6025 (0.7942) 
0.29 
30 
 
0.5899** (0.2787) 
-0.0912 (0.8034) 
-0.0031 (0.0950) 
1.1756 (1.0016) 
0.27 
30 
        Source: Author’s Estimation and Stata 14 Output 
        Note: The bootstrap standard error coefficients are in parenthesis 
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Table 4: Results of the Tests of Coefficients Equality 
Inflation and Budget Expenditure/GDP Ratio 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Wald F-statistics: 
(Prob): 
1.22 
(0.34) 
0.88 
(0.52) 
0.28 
(0.98) 
0.26 
(0.95) 
0.40 
(0.87) 
0.66 
(0.68) 
Inflation and Budget Expenditure/Money Supply (M1) Ratio 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Wald statistics: 
 (Prob): 
0.48 
(0.81) 
0.31 
(0.93) 
0.69 
(0.66) 
na 0.79 
(0.59) 
0.70 
(0.65) 
Inflation and Budget Balance/GDP Ratio 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Wald statistics: 
(Prob): 
0.44 
(0.85) 
0.15 
(0.98) 
0.21 
(0.97 
na 0.62 
(0.71) 
0.21 
(0.97) 
     Source: Author’s Estimation and Stata 14 Output. 
Although, the estimated coefficients of the fiscal variables in the three fiscal dominance 
assessments are different across the three quantiles, in different economic magnitudes, 
the results of the tests of the coefficient equality in Table 4 above reveal that the F-
statistics are insignificance at 5% level of significance. Therefore, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that these coefficients across the three quantiles are equal and this 
informs that these conditional quantiles are identical in output. 
5. Conclusions 
The broad suggestions from evidence gathered from this paper is that fiscal dominance 
could not be ‘significantly’ established statistically in the countries forming the WAMZ. 
For the future monetary union this is an indication that there are evidence to suggest that 
price stability in each of the WAMZ countries are achieved through the use of fiscal policy 
instruments at the national levels and that monetary policy is not dormant in these 
economies. Since fiscal policy would be left at national levels (at least at the initial stage 
of the monetary union), these results suggest that the common monetary policy would be 
active in achieving its desired goals, whereas, national fiscal policy would have no effects 
in this respect.  
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